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Abstract 
 
This chapter addresses the two important themes that we believe characterise how the platform-
based gig economy operates. The first of the two themes explores the shifting boundaries of 
the triangular business model and its place within the wider, evolving capitalist structure. The 
triangular business model is the foundation of the platform-based gig economy and consists of 
the digital platform, the producer/worker and the end consumer. The digital platform acts as 
the intermediary and provides a market for exchange of goods and services between the 
workers and the end consumers. The fluidity of the triangular relationship has left the platform-
based gig economy beyond the reach of the traditional neoliberal regulatory system leading to 
the blurring of employee and employer relations. The second theme is based on the exploration 
and application of the Marxist concept of surplus value creation and its appropriation within 
the gig structure. Here we seek to show the exploitation of the worker as a participant in the 
triangular business model. Given that the worker bears the majority of the entrepreneurial risk 
and provides capital they ought to receive a proportion of the surplus value created from the 
transaction. We have established the increasing dominance of platforms within the triangular 
business model and the enhanced scope for exploitation of workers in form of poor 
remuneration standards due to employee status ambiguity and the appropriation of a 
disproportionate amount of surplus value flowing to the platform owners.  
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 Introduction  
 
We are in the midst of a seismic reorganisation of the global economy, characterised by the 
emergence of a ‘digital platform economy’ which has consequently changed the way we work, 
socialise and create value in the economy. This digitally based new economic system that 
operates through a myriad of platform-based markets and complex ecosystems, has radically 
transformed the way economic agents interact with one another. Digital platform-based 
businesses were created as a strategy response to intense price competition and have 
completely changed the way we consume goods and services. The platforms allow the 
realisation of commercial value from under-utilised assets and enables entrepreneurs to work 
on flexible schedules thus attracting users and generating (rental) value from the emerging 
ecosystem. Much of the discussion and debate around the gig economy focuses on its prolific 
growth & dominance and the dramatic consequences it has created for society, markets, 
businesses, consumers, and workers.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the economic theoretical foundations of the gig economy, 
specifically exploring the shifting boundaries of modern-day capitalism and the place of the 
gig economy within it. Another key aim is also to explore the way different forms of value are 
created and appropriated within the gig economy and to analyse the rising conflict associated 
with the distribution of value and the notion of exploitation. To do this we start by defining the 
characteristics of the gig economy and go on to discuss controversies surrounding the gig 
economy and the rising conflict with the private capitalism and market structures. These issues 
then considered within the scope and scale of the gig economy both globally and within the 
UK. The theoretical foundations of the gig economy illustrating historical concepts of 
capitalism and outlining the progression to modern structures of neo-liberal and cooperative 
capitalism which operate as rules-based systems are then considered in the context of the rise 
of gig economy. In concluding these debates we explore whether the Marxist definition of 
surplus value creation is applicable to the gig economy and consider whether its distribution is 
equitable.  The concepts of value proposition and the scope for exploitation to take place with 
respect to the appropriation of value created is then explored.  From here we draw conclusions 
and policy recommendations for fairer distribution of value in the gig economy. 
 
 
 
 Definition and Controversies 
The emergence of digital platforms has caused a major disruption to existing market structures 
and organisations within them by resetting and transforming the way value is created and 
captured, playing regulatory arbitrage, repackaging work and repositioning power in the 
economic system (Baltimore et.al 2016). Value is created by the digital ecosystem and the 
platforms set the terms by which consumers and producers can participate. All digital platforms 
act as mediators or intermediaries connecting participants who then engage in some form of 
market exchange of goods and services (in cases they can add value too). The advances in 
technology of networking has enabled these platforms to develop far-reaching marketplaces 
and thereby attain leading positions in their respective markets by achieving strong economies 
of scale and scope. There are two broad types of digital platforms – asset based or capital-based 
platforms and on-demand labour based ones (Farrell & Greig, 2016).  It is not the case that all 
gig economy work takes place with a platform structure. A great deal of the present literature 
focuses upon the platform economy as we will in this chapter as well. In platform structures 
the case for exploitation and shifting boundaries is most apparent. Furthermore a lot of research 
has focused upon Uber, which is a platform based company, due to the availability of data 
released by Uber which has allowed an understanding of the micro-level aspect of a platform 
case (Hall & Krueger, 2018).  
There are several key features that characterise a gig economy (Stewart & Stanford, 
2017)  namely, work is performed on an on-demand basis and jobs are compensated on a task-
by-task basis; the gig worker provides some or all of the capital equipment required for the job; 
jobs are organised around some form of digital mediation; and finally, that there is triangular 
relationship between the producer, final consumer and the intermediary (platform owner). In 
addition to these core characteristics (Bajwa, Knorr, Di Ruggiero, Gastaldo, & Zendel, 2018) 
suggest additional features that are based on workers’ experience in the gig economy, these 
 include the blurring of the boundaries between personal and professional time including full 
time and casual work; the short-term relationship between the workers and clients; the 
classification of workers as independent contractors; the difference in skill levels employed in 
the gig economy; the ‘non-employer’ firm status of businesses operating in this system; and 
finally the fact that the platform businesses are the main beneficiaries of the  gig economy. 
These characteristics are consistent with the Dynamic Structural Model outlined in the 
Introductory chapter one of this volume  
Some of these core characteristics of the gig economy are by no means new phenomena 
or specific to this ‘digital platform economy’. The casualization of work and income have 
existed historically in many occupations within the capitalist system dating back to the 
practices of the European mercantilists (Finkin, 2016; Stewart & Stanford, 2017; Valenduc & 
Vendramin, 2016). Apart from the rapid growth and integration of technological innovation 
the business model used in the gig-economy is very similar to existing and historical economic 
systems and hence the organisation of gig work and the associated regulatory challenges are 
by no means novel, however it presents distinct challenges.  
In more recent years many scholars (Bonicu, 2016, van Doorn, 2017) attribute the 
resurgence of the gig business model as an aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The 
consequent global recession and austerity measures forced many of the recently-laid-off, 
unemployed and underemployed people to look for new employment opportunities either on a 
project by project basis or by mobilising underutilised resources and assets owned, as an 
alternative source of income. These labour and capital platforms have led to the digitization of 
trust and the emergence of a decentralised peer-to-peer network (Sundararajan, 2016). The 
main difference between gig business model and similar historical models lies in the 
technological innovations and positive re-branding of ‘gig work’ within the neo-liberal 
framework. Historically capitalism has moved through phases of formal collectivisation in 
 market structure and organisation of labour, such as the end of the putting out system under 
which workers produced goods for an employer whilst in their own home. This was succeeded 
by collectivisation in factories as technology developed to mechanise production in many 
industries following the first industrial revolution. Adverse economic conditions in the 1930’s 
caused some deformalisation to occur as an effort to minimise labour costs (usually in the form 
of shorter hours employment), although at the turn of the 20th century piece-work was 
becoming less common in some professions. As technology develops it is reasonable to assume 
working practices will adapt.     
Throughout history, working practices have evolved and in some respects the new 
triangular structure is a return to the ‘putting out’ system where work was sub-contracted and 
completed either in their own homes or in workshops with multiple craftsmen. This system is 
often considered as a form of Proto-Industrialization in which certain industries such as cotton 
spinning and clock making were collectivised in new factories due to the advances of the 
industrial revolutions. With the advent of Taylorist working practices focussing on economic 
efficiency along with Fordism which oversaw the mechanisation, mass production, mass 
consumption and the introduction of a ‘living wage’ (Gullickson, 1983) there were major 
disruptions to the traditional working practices. Increasing market pressure has eroded the 
Fordist wage and globalisation has collectivized physical industry further and since 1945 
driven an increasingly consumer society.  
Complication arises in the platform structure from the triangular relationship between 
the intermediary, the producer/worker and the end user. The triangular relationship as discussed 
by Stewart and Stanford (2017), is the interaction between the producer/worker and the end-
consumer enabling them to exchange goods and services through a process that is facilitated   
by a third party who is the digital intermediary. The contractual arrangement between the 
 intermediary and the worker allows the worker to use the platform to reach the end customer 
and the intermediary firm the right set the rules of worker participation including terminating 
their use of platform. Interestingly the burden of risk falls on the worker who bears the brunt 
of the precarious nature of work, occupational vulnerabilities and platform-based 
vulnerabilities. Some platforms retain control of working volume and working conditions. In 
addition these companies simultaneously distance themselves from responsibilities with 
respect to employees rights and accountability for the services provided by their ‘sellers’ 
(Healy, Nicholson, & Pekarek, 2017).  
The contract between the intermediary and the customer is also skewed and limits the 
obligations and responsibilities of the intermediary. In this triangulate structure the firm 
(platform) ceases to be responsible for all aspects of the customer experience and this is 
captured in the labour power provided by the worker who in some platform structures are 
performance managed (eg Uber Ratings) and in cases the restrictions in worker activity are 
extreme as shown in (Wilson, 2018)). The platform businesses have the advantage of 
differentiated information sets between each of the three parties and can proactively set the 
terms for the end users and producers to interact. As a result the relationship between the gig 
worker and the end-user is more unclear and depends to some extent on the rules set by the 
intermediary. This also means that in most cases there is no binding contract between the 
producer and the end-consumer as it is mostly dictated by the intermediary.  
The ‘Gig Economy’ has proven to be a source of controversy in context to its 
relationship with the traditional ‘9 to 5’ economy which exists alongside it. Here the triangular 
relationship within the gig structure and the unequal application of regulation has created 
asymmetries in pay & remuneration. Although the triangular relationship also has historical 
precedence it is the main source of controversy in the current context. This structure allows the 
platform owner to distance itself from the worker making the relationship between the two 
 unclear.  This muddies the traditional employer-employee relationship by allowing the 
platform owners to classify workers as independent contractors or self-employed while 
subjecting them to ambiguous rules and criteria for success. So far platforms have been able to 
do so by disaggregating jobs into micro-tasks which are completed on an ‘on demand’ basis 
and by paying workers on a task by task basis. This enables the platforms to distance 
themselves from the workers and to disaggregate the workforce  (Healy et al., 2017) . The 
platform economy is different from other forms of contract work as it is on-line and crosses 
international borders.  Thus, the platform businesses are able to absolve themselves from any 
of the responsibilities they have towards the work force they use. They do not provide any 
benefits to their workers including pensions, health insurance, sick pay severance etc. They are 
not accountable for their workers’ protection in terms of minimum wage, work-place safety or 
antidiscrimination laws. The burden of risk is heavily placed on the worker and therefore they 
become more vulnerable to capital losses. The disaggregation of jobs implies that the workers 
have no access to career development skills training which have an overall negative impact of 
the workforce. Under UK law gig workers can be classified as self-employed, a limb worker 
(a dependent contractor), an agency worker or an employee (Balaram, Warden, & Wallace-
Stephens, 2017). The misclassification of gig workers as independent workers makes it 
impossible for governments, unions and policy makers to regulate the gig economy. Platform 
workers are the most interesting case as their employment status is often seen as the most 
unclear of all workers in the gig economy, however this is part of a growing trend in which 
working practices have become more flexible (Wilson, 2018), with the aim of reducing labour 
costs for the employer and providing a greater value proposition to the consumer. 
Under the concept of rules-based capitalism it is important that regulation applies 
equally to all participants in a market, this allows regulators to create safeguards (for instance 
safety standards) but also encourage competition which is one of the core elements of an 
 efficient market. In the gig economy however similar regulations may not apply, some new 
market entrants have been able to classify their platforms as data companies despite their client 
value proposition being in a different sector, thereby bypassing regulations. The most notable 
example here is platforms such as Uber and Lyft. These platforms initially paid little regard to 
safety as they had exogenised this responsibility onto individual providers (Bond, 2018).  As 
brand image, which concerns the platform, is affected by issues relating to safety, much more 
effort has been made to exert control on providers to internalise the issue. For instance Uber is 
now designing safety features into its application and is enforcing background checks upon 
drivers (Uber, 2019); issues have occurred in cases however; one case of note was the discovery 
of an accused Somali war criminal driving for both Uber and Lyft in the United States for 18 
months having passed all background checks (Bronstein, Devine and Griffin, 2019). 
Conflict of motives arises when we consider the reasons why people work within the 
gig economy.  If efforts were made to ensure that employee status was applied and full workers’ 
rights were provided this can reduce flexibility within the employment. Although this would 
benefit the 30% of workers who are necessitated to work in non-conventional employment 
within the gig it would be to the detriment of the 70% who choose the flexibility of this 
employment when considering to work in the gig economy (Manyika et al., 2016). If 
regulations were put in place to ensure a minimum wage is provided this may subsequently 
lead to less choice in terms of working hours and the frequency of work. Sherk (2016) explains 
that this would hinder the ability of platform firms to serve those who are not served well by 
conventional firms. The example is Uber’s ability to better serve New York suburbs compared 
to Medallion taxis who face a greater incentive to make many short trips per hour in downtown 
New York (this logic can apply to many cases). As a result the policy implications are unclear 
as flexibility is traded off against workers’ rights which once again elucidates the inability of 
current employment laws to classify platform workers and meet the needs of those who value 
 flexible employment and those who ought to be reviving employee protection from 
exploitation.  
The City of New York has afforded minimum wage coverage to platform-based cab 
drivers on platforms such as Uber and Lyft. This has created an elevation in prices (borne by 
the consumer) which could curtail some demand but also instigate additional control from the 
platform. Such controls may include changes to the remuneration structure as bonus payments 
become unavailable (to the detriment of some casual drivers) as well as the migration of some 
drivers with lower ratings to inferior sub-platforms (Eidelson, 2019). This has been very much 
a local imposition as by contrast the Fair Work Ombudsman in Australia has rules that Uber 
drivers do not have employee status and are not eligible for minimum wage protection (Smyth, 
2019).  
   
Sherk (2016) argues that the gross salary for gig workers should reflect their entitlement 
to benefits such as  pension schemes and health insurance as they are not afforded these rights 
by their employers.  However, it is likely the case that this theory does not hold true and the 
conditions of a platform worker are not similar to those of a truly self-employed person. 
Furthermore there is often little scope for promotion or advancement from basic pay, even if 
offered at a living wage (Taylor, Marsh, Nicol, & Broadbent, 2017, p. 110). Evidence gathered 
by Taylor (2017) suggests that temporary workers who are part of the gig labour force can be 
subject to ‘in-work poverty’ and extreme uncertainty surrounding flexible contracts such as 
zero-hours contracts. 
 
Scope of the Gig Economy  
Measuring the size of the workforce in the gig economy is challenging. As much of the 
work done in the gig economy is invisible and as many gig workers do not report their work it 
 is hard to find accurate records. Most empirical work in this area has been carried out using 
survey data and organisations that have attempted to measure the size of the gig economy have 
looked at various secondary sources such as platform usage, income tax records etc. However, 
the main obstacle seems to be stemming from the definitional issues around the gig sector. 
Existing academic and grey literature around the gig economy all seem to use their own 
nuanced characteristics when defining the gig-economy. There is a lack of standardisation in 
measuring the size of gig sector as a result of lack of accurate information due to nature of gig 
work, which is often unregulated, unprotected and under-reported.   
In spite these challenges, some recent attempts have begun to demonstrate the extent of 
the digital labour force participation on the global arena. The report by McKinsey Global 
Institute, October 2016, suggests that 20% to 30% of the US and EU15 working age population 
can be classified as independent workers, that is around 162 million people. However, the 
definition used by McKinsey Report is broader than what we use for this particular chapter. 
Their definition includes three characteristics namely that work is a short-term duration, 
workers are paid by task and that workers have a high degree of control and autonomy, it does 
not specify the use of a digital platform. McKinsey report goes on to suggest that, of this total 
nearly 44% of these independent workers depend on gig work as their primary source of income 
and the remaining treat it as supplemental income. However, it is quite interesting to see that 
only 30% of the independent workers are forced to work in the gig economy out of necessity 
rather than out of choice. Another interesting finding of the report is that those who do 
independent work by choice report greater satisfaction with their work lives than those who do 
it out of necessity, and this holds across countries, age groups, income and education. The 
McKinsey Report elucidates that of the total number of independent workers only 15% use 
digital platforms. Thus, for the purposes of this article, which includes digital platforms as a 
defining feature of gig work an estimated 25 million people in the US and EU-15 work in the 
 gig economy, taking into account the total figure from the McKinsey report. Looking 
exclusively at online outsourcing, the World Bank finds that in 2013 there were 48 million 
registered workers in this area. Huws, Spencer, & Joyce (2016) find that 11% of surveyed 
adults in the UK earned money through the gig economy. A comprehensive study carried out 
by the RSA (Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufacturing and Commerce) in 
conjunction with MANGOPAY (online payment technology firm) published in April 2017, 
provides a snapshot of the scale and impact of the gig economy in the UK. According to the 
RSA report an estimated 1.1 million people in Britain work in the gig economy out of which 
27% are based in London. The definition of gig work that the RSA uses is in line with the 
characteristics featured in this article.  The report finds that 59% of all gig work are in 
professional, creative of administrative services, 33% in skilled manual or personal services 
and the remaining 16% is made up of driving and delivery services. In terms of age and gender 
profile of workers in the gig economy 61% are male and 52% of all gig workers fall in the age 
bracket between 31 and 54.  It is interesting to see that 44% of gig workers have graduate level 
degrees. Data gathered on the frequency of gig work shows that 50% of gig workers work less 
than monthly and 80% work less than 16 hours per week. The general trends in the gig economy 
and the increase in the size and scope of self-employed workers in the UK since 2008 
demonstrate that ‘freedom’ and ‘flexibility’ of work seem to be the main driving force behind 
these shifting trends. However, it cannot be overlooked that the job losses and lack of 
opportunities in the traditional employment sector that were a result of the 2008 global financial 
crisis and the austerity policies in the UK have forced many to seek employment in the gig 
economy. The rise in employment in the UK has mainly been in the self-employment sector, 
which has seen a 44% rise since 2008. This trend is mirrored in the gig economy.  
 
 
 Economic Theoretical Underpinning of the Gig Economy 
There are several neo-liberal arguments supporting the business model of the shared economy 
and the benefits that it brings to society in general. The benefits of the gig economy are based 
on the foundations of neo-liberal competitive market efficiency. On the demand side, the gig 
economy provides goods and services at a lower price than those provided in traditional 
markets. Consumers are generally motivated to use these platform-based companies because 
of price savings. Another reason for the success sharing economy is greater product and service 
variety. The large number of sellers within the market offers a variety of products and services 
to meet the diverse needs of the customers. Finally, the success of the gig economy can be 
attributed to the speed with which it can provide its goods and services and the level of 
customisation of products and services as compared to their counterparts in the traditional 
economy. On the supply side the sharing of resources and key business functions via the 
platform enables individual providers to lower their transaction costs. Without the sharing of 
these resources, information and customers many start-ups would not be viable and would fold-
up. Another benefit of the gig sector is the potential for achieving democratic participation and 
redistribution. This is achieved by bringing in providers that otherwise would be marginalised 
by traditional market systems.  
The article by Bonciu et.al. (2016) presents an analytical approach to the fundamental 
premise of the sharing economy arguing the positive impact it has on the economy, society and 
environment. They argue that sustainable growth can be better achieved through sharing assets 
rather than through ownership. Mainstream neo-liberal literature on sustainable growth refers 
to the efficient and cleaner ways of using resources through technological innovation to deal 
with the challenges of population growth, demographic changes, climate change and ever-
dwindling resources. The use of digital platforms caters to this message as an economic 
activity. The emergence of the platform economy has occurred due to the major geopolitical 
 shifts that the international arena has gone through since the end of the Second World War 
(Bonciu et.al. 2016). The end of the Second World War gave rise to a bipolar economic system 
dominated by the two main superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. With the fall 
of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s the United States became the single ‘unipolar’ 
superpower. This unipolar economic structure was soon changed with the advent of China, 
India, Brazil and the Russian Federation on to the global economic and political arena giving 
rise to a multipolar world economic system (O’Sullivan et. al 2015). This multipolar system 
was characterised by the interaction of the United States (leading power) with other regional 
powers such as China, European Union and the Russian Federation etc. Alongside the rise of 
the multipolar economic system, fuelled by the success and widespread adoption of 
globalisation and financialisation, the international arena also witnessed the rise of goliath 
multinational corporations that consequently became an integral part of the multipolar system. 
Within this framework as a result of the huge advances in information and communications 
technology, ‘the individual’ subsequently became the most elementary actor in the new world 
economy. In this system individuals can conduct economic activities at a local and global scale 
via digital platforms. This is usually done through a process in which production is divided 
into multiple projects or tasks that are performed by a multitude of individuals interconnected 
by digital platforms and wider network and ecosystems. The modern-day gig economy is a 
manifestation of the individual scale multi-polar system and neo-liberal supporters of this 
system would argue that it provides the most flexible and scalable form of economic activity 
and that it also has the potential to become a significant contributor to sustainable growth and 
development.  
The gig economy is some ways is also the product of corporate financialisation. Post 
Second World War capitalism has witnessed an era in which although a large chunk profits 
generated by big companies went to their top CEOs, a considerable amount of profits was also 
 re-invested back into the company in the workforce, R&D and also in better prices for 
consumers. However, over the last few decades there has been a growing trend for non-
financial organisations and public corporations to increase their profits through financial 
activity in the capital markets and then send these gains back to the shareholders rather than 
re-investing in the firm or its workers. This shift has been so dramatic that the ratio of financial 
profits out of overall corporate profits has increased significantly in U.S. corporations 
(Lazonick, 2017). As a consequence of this firms have stopped investing in stable and 
productive workforce leading to decline in productivity, wage stagnation and job losses. This 
structural shift away from ‘productive’ to financialised’ short-term profit generation has led to 
cost cutting practices, the burden of which is mainly borne by the employees. In the gig 
economy this manifests itself in the predominance of ‘on-demand’ independent workers who 
do not have rights to any worker’s benefits or legal rights. One can thus generally conclude 
that financialisation strengthened by regulatory and legislative changes have had a negative 
impact on wages and jobs driving many traditional employees into independent contractor roles 
under precarious working conditions. 
Shifting Boundaries of Capitalism  
Although the gig economy has become a powerful force of market participation it is 
fundamentally different to the orthodox model of capitalism.  From a political economy 
perspective, it may be interesting to adopt the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach in order to 
understand the institutional framework that underlies the gig economy. The great body of work 
done in the area of ‘varieties of capitalism’ explore the institutional variations in the 
comparative capitalism models based on the response to the economic problem of that 
particular period of time. The ‘modernisation’ perspective that emerges in the post- war 
decades focussed on the challenge of industries that were still using pre-war methods of 
production (Shonfield 1965). The advocates of this approach focussed on the institutional 
 structures that gave states the leverage over the private sector such as the planning systems, 
and public influence over the flow of funds in the financial system (Cohen 1977, Estrin & 
Holmes 1983, Zysman 1983, Cox 1986). During the 1970s the main issue that plagued the 
developed economies was inflation and the new approach of comparative capitalism that was 
then adopted was coined ‘neo-corporatism’ (Schmitter & Lehmbruch 1979, Goldthorpe 1984, 
Alvarez et al. 1991). This approached broadly focusses on the capacity of the state to negotiate 
with employers and trade unions on issues regarding wages, working conditions and social and 
economic policy. An alternate approach to neo-corporatism puts less emphasis on trade union 
movement and more on the organisation of business (Katzenstein 1985, Offe 1981) The 1980s 
and 1990s highlighted a new approach of comparative capitalism termed ‘social systems of 
production’. This approach looks at how at firm behaviour in response to technological change. 
The importance of sectoral governance, national innovation systems and flexible production 
regimes all affect the reorganisation of production in response to technological change. This 
approach highlights the influence of a wider range of institutions and a more sociological view 
of business operations.  
Hall and Soskice (2001) introduces the concept of ‘strategic interactions’ central to the 
behaviour of economic agents. Their approach to comparative capitalism is based on a game 
theoretical framework within which businesses interact with different institutions in the face 
of technological innovation and increased global competition. In order to generate maximum 
profits firms need to be able to exploit their core competencies and dynamic capabilities by 
interacting and establishing strategic relationships both internally and with external 
stakeholders. Coases’ theorem highlights the impact of non-zero transaction costs implying 
that institutional arrangements and relationships are never perfect. Add to this the problem of 
asymmetric information giving rise to moral hazard, adverse selection and shirking the 
coordination of these strategic relationships is a vital component of the firm’s success. Hall 
 and Soskice identify five spheres of strategic relationships namely - industrial relations, 
vocational training and education, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and employees. 
Based on fundamental premise of strategic relationships they identify two forms of capitalism 
– the Liberal Market Economy practiced mainly by the US, UK, Australia and New Zealand 
and the Coordinated Market Economy (which is rather more Ordo-Liberal in nature) is more 
common in Germany, Japan, Belgium and the Netherlands. Only very stringent neo-liberal and 
mercantilist thinkers argue against regulation in markets. The firms within a liberal market 
economy are characterised by arms’s length exchange of goods and services in a competitive 
market structure and formal contracting. In this form of neo-liberal capitalism information is 
privately acquired by businesses, only a subset of which is publicly accessible. Market 
institutions provide highly effective means of coordinating and regulating the actions of the 
economic participants. The firms within a coordinated market structure depend heavily on the 
non-market relationships to coordinate their endeavours. These non-market modes of 
coordination generally demonstrate a more extensive relationship or incomplete contracting, 
network monitoring based on exchange of private information inside networks and more 
reliance and collaboration.  
Some may argue (Dayal-Chand 2015) that the gig economy has qualitatively more in 
common with the coordinated market economy then the liberal market economy. To generalise, 
the critical difference between the two is the collective behaviour of businesses in achieving 
success. This collaborative and collective form of capitalism, according to some, has the 
potential to produce tremendous success and wealth if the market participants have the right 
legal and institutional infrastructure to support and regulate them. One of the overarching 
features of the gig economy, that is common with the coordinated market economy is the 
interaction of businesses with each other. Rather than competing against one another for 
resources such as employees, market information, product development and marketing and 
 finance, these resources are mostly shared by businesses. This is achieved through the digital 
or technological platform which allows them to share a common source of customers 
efficiently and cheaply. The contractual arrangements between the economic agents involved 
are not as formal as in the liberal market economy and are more akin to ‘contracts of adhesion’. 
Another significant feature of the gig economy as a coordinated market economy is the 
importance of institutional intermediaries that accomplish coordination amongst individual 
businesses. In the gig economy these intermediaries are typically the providers of the 
technological platforms. These platforms perform three functions: the sharing of critical 
business resources, the monitoring of network participants and the sanctioning of participants. 
Institutions within the coordinated market economy have accomplished collaborations in the 
sphere of labour relations, vocational training, corporate governance, inter-firm relations and 
employee relations. In the gig economy businesses share access to technology to find 
clients/end users and also to find also to establish ongoing supply of products and services, 
highlighting the extraordinary level to which sharing permeates interfirm relations. The 
stability of demand and supply is maintained for the entire network through the technological 
platform. Corporate governance within the gig economy may be defined as set of relations that 
support firms to access financing. The technological platforms are able to resource finance for 
businesses from both traditional investors and through crowd funding routes.  
The conceptual failure of policy makers to understand the gig economy as different 
form of capitalism that does not neatly fit into the liberal market economy structure as it has 
been historically defined, is the primary cause of regulatory failure in the gig economy. Policy 
makers who are used to neoliberal competitive market structures and formal contracts thus find 
it difficult to decide whether a company like Uber should be classified as an employer of 
hundreds of drivers or a software developer who enters into formal licensing arrangement with 
a large number of independent businesses.  
 In this cooperative Germanic/Austrian structure of capitalism which is intertwined with 
Ordo-Liberal ideology the state plays the part of a regulator who can improve market outcomes 
however it is careful to preserve the competitive structure which is the most efficient 
determinate of supply and demand. This is exemplified by the thoughts of economists such as 
FA Hayek. A Keynesian extension would further link macroeconomic factors, principally price 
levels (Keynes, 2015), to the determination of supply and demand which introduces a temporal 
element in which previous supply becomes a determinant of future demand.   
The concept of market structure is much more overt in the philosophy of Hayek, by 
examining Hayek’s thoughts on recession and the organic nature of an economy it is possible 
to understand how the current gig economy has been a product of the capitalist system. The 
organic nature of the economy is best interpreted as ‘being subject to Darwinian forces’ in 
which firms respond to recession and only those capable of innovating (including reducing 
costs) survive into the next growth period. Where a firm reduces costs and is able to reduce the 
market price it should emerge into the following growth period. 
This explains the rise of the gig economy as a means of reducing transaction costs, 
reducing labour costs and to a degree serving as a vector for outsourcing. Collectivisation of 
work replaced the putting-out system as economies of scale developed and mechanisation 
changed the market structure toward a formal and rigid structure with clear boundaries between 
capitalists and workers which is written about by Karl Marx when he illustrates class conflict. 
The current structure is less class based and likely much more flexible than put-out work 
however this flexibility and the unclear relationships combines with unequal regulatory 
treatment have created scope for conflict as the boundaries of working structurers have shifted 
into uncharted waters.  
Ultimately we can conclude that the gig economy is the result of the following factors 
that, historically, acted, unintentionally, in coordination the a) the collapse of Keynesianism 
 and Fordism b) the collapse of the Bretton Woods system c) the rise of neo-ordo economics as 
a viable alternative d) perpetual technological innovation and advancements e) the end of 
collective bargaining and the fragmentation of the labour force. 
Analysis of Surplus Value in the gig economy  
Marx is strict in his definitions of value, this stems from the concept of money being a means 
of purchasing as a measure of capital, Marx takes this from Ricardo who attributes no profit to 
capital in the form of money (Marx, Fowkes, & Fernbach, 1990, Chapter 6). Increases in value 
are therefore occur between the circulation of capital and the transformative processes that 
increases the use-value. In the process of human transformation during circulation we observe 
the creation and capture of surplus value.  
According to Marx, under the capitalist mode of production the value of a commodity 
is derived from the socially necessary labour-time required to produce it (Capital Volume 1). 
In this production process, labour-power, which is dissociated from the objects and means of 
production, is purchased by the owner of the means of production, the capitalist, in an open 
market in exchange of a contract defining the terms and conditions of employment. The value 
of this specific commodity, of the labour-power, is measured by the ‘new value added by the 
expenditure of labour to the existing value of capital (machinery, infrastructure etc.) used in 
the process of production. ‘Socially necessary’ labour refers to a given state of society where 
labour skills, labour intensity and conditions of production are averaged out. Socially necessary 
labour-time takes a money form by establishing a universal equivalent or benchmark, which 
Marx terms as money-commodity. Therefore, the value of any commodity can be expressed in 
money-value form by expressing it in terms of the universal equivalent. Following this line of 
enquiry Marx subsequently argues that ‘price is the labour objectified in a commodity’ (Capital 
Vol 1) and establishes that the price of a commodity may not always be equal its exact value 
but more likely to be proportional to its value.  
 In Marx’s view labour-power is also a commodity whose value can be similarly defined 
as that of any other commodity, i.e. the socially necessary labour-time expended in it. Given 
that labour-power exists within workers, its production requires the worker to be able to subsist. 
According to Marx, means of subsistence should not only cover things that enable a worker to 
maintain his social reproduction, such as food, clothing, housing etc. but also costs incurred 
for acquiring new skills and training. Given that labour-power is a commodity that can be sold 
in the market for its exchange value, which in turn is spent on means of subsistence, it can be 
inferred that the value of labour-power tends to equal to value of the subsistence commodity 
bundle, although wages under certain regimes of industrial relations in the 20th century offered 
subsistence not just for the worker but also for his family (the Fordist wage), this was 
introduced along with Taylorist working practices that exploited labour power. 
More generally the value or price of labour-power can be classified as the wage rate. 
Following on from the concept of labour-time, surplus value is the new value that is created by 
workers in excess of their own labour-cost (wage) which is appropriated by the capitalist as 
profit when the commodity is sold. In the capitalist mode of production workers produce value 
unequal to their wages because it incorporates surplus value (captured by the capitalist). Marx 
argues that it is worker’s labour-power or his capacity to work that is the source of surplus 
value. A worker who is sufficiently productive can produce an output of much greater value 
than it costs to hire him, in other words the wage that the worker receives does not reflect the 
full value of what the worker produces. It is the capitalist that obtains the surplus value in the 
form of profit and the worker cannot capture this benefit as he/she has no legal claim to the 
means of production and has limited bargaining power over wages they can demand.  
Surplus value averages out as average rate of profit for an enterprise and, together with 
other forms of capital sources capital accumulation in a capitalist society. This is the main 
driving force of capitalism. According to Marx the capitalist can extract more surplus value by 
 increasing the length of the working day or week (absolute surplus value) or by reducing wages, 
reducing the cost of subsistence commodity bundle or by increasing the productivity and 
intensity of labour through mechanisation (technological innovation). Marx highlights that the 
core conflict between the social classes is the constant quest to maximise the appropriation of 
surplus value versus the constant resistance to exploitation (workers versus capitalists).  
Another important point that Marx highlights that no net additions to value can be 
created through acts of exchange, as value is created from labour-power in the material process 
of real commodity production. Linking concepts of surplus value creation and appropriation to 
the gig economy: The discussion below is premised on the fact the surplus value is extracted 
only in material production or provision of a service, which is then used as collateral by the 
service sector to build on platforms and structures of exchange for the benefit of the owners of 
those platforms. Surplus value is equal to the surplus value captured divided by initial capital 
stock (s/C), it is the capitalist’s role to maximise surplus value capture, relying upon the fetish 
of law if necessary. Given the boundaries of working relationships as set out above it is possible 
to examine concept of value and surplus value through a critical analysis of shifting boundaries 
which characterise gig work. This is an issue of pay and remuneration which contributes to the 
precariousness of gig work as exemplified by the Dynamic Structural Model of the gig 
economy outlined in Chapter One, furthermore this is an elucidation of how exploitation takes 
place in this structure. We now outline how the Marxist analysis is applicable to the case of the 
Platform Economy.  
A capitalist by virtue appropriates surplus value produced by workers. Normally a gig 
worker is paid per task and not ‘by the hour’ this leaves room for the platform to extract 
absolute surplus value. The amount of time it takes for a gig-worker to complete a task depends 
on their productive capacity.  The higher productive capacity the greater the surplus value 
generated and appropriated by the platform. The gig worker does not benefit from this and has 
 very little bargaining power distribution of surplus value, especially since supply-side 
economic policy minimised the redistributive mechanisms of the welfare state.  
The gig economy, based on the notion of flexible working hours, has allowed for the 
blurring of the concept of a ‘traditional working day’ creating an environment for a 24-hour 
working culture. This is another example of how surplus value is extracted by platforms by 
extending the working hours with little or no resistance form the gig workers. 
Platforms maximise surplus value appropriation through relative surplus value extraction.  In 
most cases gig workers are not paid the minimum wage, nor do they receive any pension or 
benefits related to their work, sick leave etc. This is another form of surplus value appropriation 
by the platform owner as they have able to suppress wages and other forms of employment 
benefits. 
Platform owners are able to extract and appropriate surplus value although gig worker 
bears the burden of risk. Under a capitalist mode of production, the entrepreneur was rewarded 
for bearing the risk of starting a business venture. However, in a gig economy although the 
burden of risk is placed on the shoulders of the gig worker/producer it is the platform owner 
who reaps the benefit of extracting profits. In this case by providing the market for transaction 
and other businesses services that otherwise may not be available to the gig worker. It is 
therefore only fair that the platform owner gets a share of the profit. The case for exploitation 
is made in the light that the worker who holds some properties of a capitalist should capture a 
portion of the surplus value, this may or may not be the case and without microeconomic data 
this is a theoretical possibility for exploitation to take place as risk is exogonised by the 
platform.   
Here the gig worker provides part or all of the capital required to complete a task and 
therefore should receive a proportion of the profits/surplus value created. In conventional 
Marxist analysis an individual is either a capitalist (the employer) or a worker (who sells his 
 labour power to a capitalist). This long-established convention does not hold under the 
triangular relationships of the platform economy. Here the worker/provider has characteristics 
of an employee but also of a capitalist as they bear entrepreneurial risk by providing their own 
capital and bearing responsibility for their own degree of Human Capital (Theory of Human 
Capital). As the role of the capitalist is not held by a single person it is necessary to consider 
that surplus value is not appropriated by a single person. In this case the motive of the platform 
to exploit the worker remains clear as the platform will capture some (although possibly not 
all) of the surplus value accruing from transformative activity, this is exemplified in some of 
the Taylorist and micro-managing practices which are seen within the platform economy in 
addition to the usual division of labour outlined by Adam Smith in the eighteenth century.  
For example Uber drivers (workers) are a source of labour, they provide some of the capital of 
the business (they own/lease the cars) and provide labour however Uber too provides the 
platform for matching cars and passengers, this is a form of ‘cognitive rent’ (Fisher, 2015). As 
the driver is partly a capitalist and partly a worker the question reduces to how much of the 
surplus value is each party entitled to.   
It is true that Marx argues no net additions to value can be created through acts of 
exchange, economic value being an attribute of labour-products (previous or newly created) 
only. Nevertheless, trading activity outside the sphere of production can obviously also yield a 
surplus value which represents a transfer of value from one person, country or institution to 
another. This is what happens in the gig economy. A very simple example would be if 
somebody sold a second-hand asset at a profit. This transaction is not recorded in gross product 
measures (after all, it isn't new production), nevertheless a surplus-value is obtained from it. 
Marx occasionally refers to this kind of profit as profit upon alienation.  
Here it is possible to introduce the concept of domination in relationships between 
capitalists and workers. These relationships are characterised by forms of dominance, the 
 strictly dominating relationship that exists between capitalists and their workers is the crux of 
the critical view and is set out in the Marxist analysis of the origin and destination of the surplus 
value of production. The more curious relationship is that of the ‘dominated dominator’ 
whereby societal convention forces the capitalists to adhere to the profit maximising structure, 
simply for the fact that all others in the market are doing so (Ypi, 2018). This reflects the 
competitive or monopolistically competitive market structure in which defection from profit 
maximisation causes a business to cease to be viable (as capitalists struggle to compete against 
each other). In this sense no particular capitalist is more immoral than another, however no 
capitalist is singly able to defect away from profit maximising as they are bound into the 
structure of capitalism.  
Consider as an example in the UK market Deliveroo competes with Just Eat and Uber 
Eats in the platform-based food delivery market. These firms serve as an intermediary between 
restaurants and customers by providing their own drivers. In February 2019 Uber Eats reduced 
its fee from a maximum of 35% to a maximum of 30% of the meal value whilst also allowing 
restaurants to use the platform whilst providing their own delivery service (Ram & Bond, 
2019).  
This has allowed restaurants to reduce the commission paid via two routes and clearly 
depicts that a commission is charged to reflect the value added by the existence of the platform 
which markets restaurants and provides a mechanism for payment. With the presence of falling 
costs to the restaurants these firms may prove a viable way to outsource the delivery aspect of 
their business however said platforms add value in their own right and it is interesting that Uber 
is now promoting itself as an intermediary platform only to outsource the need for a restaurant 
to maintain an individual online presence. Here we see the existence of a dominated dominator 
(Ypi, 2018) as the growth of online consumption and web-based platforms necessitates take-
away restaurants to adopt a platform (or multiple platforms) in order to innovate to the market 
 standard. Simultaneously the platforms must compete for custom and offer low value capture 
as they are beholden to the right of the restaurant to choose a provider. Of course, the platforms 
may still exert dominance and apply elements of control hence the platforms in the competitive 
case are dominated dominators; exactly like any conventional firm in a freely competitive 
market.  
Conclusion  
The Taylor Review of Modern Working Practices (2017) commissioned by the UK government 
looks at the fluidity of business models that necessitate the changes in employment practices. 
Subsequent grey literature published by the Work and Pensions and Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy Committees and other government departments have called for increased 
clarity on the employment status within the constantly shifting boundaries of different neo-
liberal business models. The policy papers recognize that it is difficult for the average worker, 
with little or no knowledge of employment regulations, to understand what category status they 
fall into and the rights and benefits they are entitled to. Although the expansion of self-
employed and business models built around flexible work on digital platforms promise positive 
opportunities for entrepreneurs, workers and consumers alike they could lead to potential 
exploitation due to the confusion around rights and entitlements of workers. There is evidence 
high-lighted in various legal cases and grey literature that acknowledges that exploitation is 
already occurring and therefore there is an urgent and overwhelming case for reform and 
legislation reflecting the case law. We have explored in this chapter that the exploitation within 
the gig economy not only takes the form of lost rights and entitlements but also arises from the 
appropriation and distribution of surplus value within the system. There are no clear boundaries 
in this business model about how much surplus value generated by the economic actions of 
each agent within this eco-system and even less clarity on how it should be distributed and a 
fair and non-exploitative way. The complex nature of the gig ecosystem and the symbiotic 
 relationship between each of the economic agents within make it virtually impossible to 
differentiate the contributions to surplus value made at each stage of the production process. 
However, what is currently evidently clear is that the digital platform provider is the dominant 
force in this ecosystem and that they have significant power over the other key players (worker 
and end-user). It is true that the platform, as the intermediary brings the different market forces 
into play, but it is also true that the without the input from other economic agents the platform 
would be meaningless. In this context reform and clarity is essential to avoid exploitation 
within the system but we have also discussed in the chapter that regulation has a direct impact 
on flexibility and control within this business model. It is true that a flexible work force can 
provide benefits to workers consumers and platforms but that does not necessarily mean that 
the worker should bear all the risks of this flexibility. Policy recommendations therefore must 
reflect on the issues discussed in this chapter to provide a more robust foundation to the gig 
business model.  
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